The Growing Threat to
Humanitarian Operations
Deminers and other humanitarian-aid workers around the world, though previously
viewed as off-limits, have become targets of distrust and even violence by certain
groups. This article explores the reasons for this shift in ideology, and what action humanitarian organizations must take in order to protect their personnel.
by Adrian King [ HMS, Ltd. ]

T

he days of showing respect to civilian humanitarian-aid personnel and organizations in the field
are long gone, so that even the once sacrosanct
International Committee of the Red Cross is no longer safe from attack. In recent times, increased rhetoric
against the United Nations and humanitarian-aid agencies, mainly from jihadist groups (such as those in the
call-out box below), has led to a long overdue appraisal
of the vulnerability of aid workers and U.N. peacekeeping personnel as the global security situation deteriorates and risk of violent attack increases.

and its allies, to suppress Islam, spread Christianity in
the Muslim world, and support an invasion and occupation strategy directed toward Muslim countries. These
views can be seen in the Afghan Talibans' monthly magazine, Al Samood.
One only has to look at the grim record of attacks
against personnel working for U.N. agencies and other humanitarian-aid organizations to appreciate the
fragile and, at times, near non-existent nature of security measures taken in the field. Humanitarian organizations and personnel must understand that deprived

“The UN is also standing with the enemy against Muslims
what about the standing Muslim matters like Palestine,
Chechnya, Cyprus ... and other Muslim matters, all these are
evidence of the oppression of the UN against Muslim countries ...”
Al Somood, The Struggle1 (jihadist propaganda)
The Developing Mindset

Since the rise in international terrorism, providing
aid has become more of a high-risk occupation than ever
before. Military operations both in Afghanistan and Iraq
have fueled the ill-informed and biased speculation of the
jihadists and stirred suspicion of Western motives in these
and other regions, with aid workers often seen as agents
of military powers. Both the United Nations and aid organizations are now viewed in some areas of the world as
being part of a Western agenda, led by the United States
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populations’ access to aid must be balanced against underlying security threats where, as a consequence, the
susceptibility and accessibility of aid personnel and
their local employees is increased, and the risk of violent compromise in certain locations is ever more likely.
Valuable Human Assets

Personnel engaged in humanitarian work are dedicated to the work they do and the people they serve.
Thoroughly commited to their vocation, these aid work-

U.S. Army soldiers assigned to the 203rd Combat Engineer Battalion of the Missouri Army National Guard use a tracked excavator to remove tons of rubble and debris as rescue workers search for victims at the United Nations Office of the Humanitarian Coordinator building in Baghdad, Iraq, after a truck bomb destroyed much of the building on 19 August 2003.
Photo courtesy of Master Sergeant James M. Bowman, USAF

ers venture into areas and situations considered by most
to have an unacceptable risk of attack or at least confrontation with hostile groups. These groups, for one
reason or another, do not appreciate or support the aid
work carried out, and because of their beliefs, view humanitarian-aid workers and those who support them as
viable targets for aggression.
In the demining world, work is often conducted in
countries where the underlying security situation is unstable or where low-level conflict is in progress. However, exceptions exist. In Afghanistan, Iraq and Somalia
for example, mine-action activities continue effectively despite widespread and ongoing violence, where no
peaceful resolution is in sight and the situation may escalate at any time. In the case of Afghanistan, NATO
maintains that its in-country presence is for the purposes of stabilization and infrastructure development.
Unfortunately, this gives the impression that the “war”
has been won when it is apparent that ever more violence occurs daily in communities and organizations
throughout the country.
Sanctioning the deployment of U.N.-armed military
personnel to a country or region in crisis not only shows
that violence is expected, but that weapons used for pro-

tection are essential to the success of legally mandated
work in agreement between national governance and the
United Nations. The question then has to be asked, in
view of this decision to deploy an armed force, on what
basis do nongovernmental organizations and private
and commercial companies deploy their personnel to
such areas, where the risk of attack is high and the level of protection offered is generally not commensurate
with the threats that may be encountered?
As previously alluded to, many individuals are
“called” to intercede on behalf of the victims of crisis
through their vocation and belief, but what is their level
of responsibility, both to themselves and to those who
will support them in-country and be formally engaged
by them in the conduct of their mission? And perhaps
more importantly, what is the responsibility of the organizations that employ humanitarian workers?
The posed questions are not meant to undermine
an individual’s integrity or an organization’s justification for carrying out humanitarian work, but to provoke
discussion on the criteria used to guide risk assessment.
This assessment should be conducted with the expatriate
professionals and the local nationals involved at varying
levels, from humble driver to mission manager.
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Process and Procedure

The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are the legal basis for categorizing humanitarian work; they guarantee protection for humanitarian workers provided that
they are not party to the conflict. The Conventions do
not, however, give right of access to conflict areas; and
although combatant attacks on humanitarian personnel
are prohibited, providing escorts is not a requirement, including where other factions may pose a threat to safety.
This article does not provide an analysis of all attacks
on U.N. or other aid personnel, but in analyzing demining specifically, it is possible to draw a loose analogy
from the evidence gathered through attacks and, in some
2

flict and enabling infrastructure renewal and a return to
normal life activity. For the majority, mine action would
be seen as an essential and normal part of a country’s
post-conflict recovery process, and many would perhaps
struggle to understand why people would oppose such
action taking place. The reality is not so simple, however, and in assessing the chronological data of attacks on
demining personnel, one has to surmise that a political
motive is often the basis for the incident. In Afghanistan,
the Taliban see the United Nations and other aid organizations as collaborators with NATO’s International Stabilization Force and corruptors of the Muslim religion,
views echoed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

“The UN is a tool of American global politics, duping people by
claiming that it is a neutral international organization, where it is in
fact a criminal American institution; the presidential election in Kabul is evidence enough of this. This organization has not been
established to support and help people, and since it was established, it has taken part and contributed to war crimes ...
In the same way the invader forces will be forced to leave
Afghanistan; this institution called the UN must leave for good ...”
~ Al Somood. The Struggle”1 (jihadist propaganda)
cases, predict a continuance of the trend in some countries and regions. Since 2003, more than 50 mine-action
personnel have died from non-mine related injuries, the
majority in Afghanistan.3 The evidence shows that, in
most cases, attacks are targeted directly at the demining
workers and not randomly, as some believe. In the majority of the incidents, the attacks were carried out using
small arms and improvised explosive devices, the latter
of which are a well-known threat in Afghanistan and a
growing threat globally, and which allow precise targeting without exposure to retaliation or identification of
the perpetrator(s) at the incident scene.
Deminers as Targets

Mine action is an activity built on military breaching and explosive ordnance disposal skills to remove
area explosive hazards, thus allowing repatriation of
displaced persons and communities following the con-
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For these reasons, attacks on the United Nations
and humanitarian-aid workers, including demining
personnel, are justified in the perpetrators’ minds, but
aid workers’ links with sponsors and other organizations may further strengthen motives, as in the case of
the lethal attack on deminers in Kandahar province on
11 April 2010, where the Office of Weapons Removal
and Abatement in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau
of Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA) sponsored the
victims’ demining activity. This extra “link” (i.e., the
sponsorship) may provide an additional motive for an
attacker to target one aid group over another and should
possibly be part of the risk-assessment process.
Another possible motive for attacking deminers in
Afghanistan and elsewhere is because mine action removes resources from the Taliban’s arsenal. Their use of
explosive remnants of war as main charges in their IEDs,
or even as a viable ammunition source, is well known.

This was recognized in Iraq during
the height of the insurgency, where
foreign contractors were deliberately used to remove explosive ordnance from stockpiles and former
battle positions in an attempt to interrupt the chain of activities that led
to building IEDs to attack Coalition
troops.
Protecting Deminers

As employers, humanitarian demining organizations have a duty of
care and responsibility toward their
personnel. Top-level personnel must
thoroughly investigate the risk of attack and assess and mitigate against
apparent threats in the country and

the growing threat levels, aid organizations in general should take a
more responsible stance in providing levels of security. If it is known
that attacks are likely and that reprisals may also be visited on local
workers as a result of mine action
or any other humanitarian activity,
the decision to deploy at all should
be questioned.
The United Nations, which oversees demining and other contracts,
should perhaps also play its part by
ensuring organizations and individuals are aware of the inherent risks of
working in a particular country or
region and that they are taking the
proper security precautions. Person-

“... attacks on the United Nations and humanitarianaid workers, including demining personnel, are justified in the perpetrators’ minds, but aid workers’ links
with sponsors and other organizations may further
strengthen motives ...”
~ Al Somood. The Struggle”1 (jihadist propaganda)
region of the proposed work activity.
At the lower levels, the duty extends,
through managers and team leaders,
to enacting and maintaining the security plan and providing local operating procedures and resources in
managing the risks described.
The threshold for conducting or
suspending mine-action operations
due to security concerns is usually
a responsibility of the mine-action
coordination center, if present incountry, normally on advice from
a number of internal and external
agencies. Yet is this enough? Is it
sufficient, and is it justifiable in high
threat-level locations such as Afghanistan and Somalia? Surely with
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nel validation should begin prior to
arrival in the country and should include checks to make certain that employees are sufficiently briefed and
trained on safety issues, and provided with the resources, including
procedures and equipment, to safely conduct their work. However, this
should only happen after an organization understands the risks involved
and has determined whether it is prudent to allow the commencement or
sustainment of humanitarian demining activity in a specific area.
see endnotes page 82
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